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Models, Modelling, Metaphors and Metaphorical 
Thinking – From an Educational  
Philosophical View 
Nina Bonderup Dohn ∗ 
Abstract: »Modelle, Modellierung, Metaphern und metaphorisches Denken - 
Aus einer pädagogisch-philosophischen Sicht«. In this contribution, I present 
my view of models and metaphors within educational research, very broadly 
speaking. I start out by articulating my educational philosophical perspective as 
a form of applied philosophy. Inspired by Ricœur, I then define models as “in-
struments for configuration and reconfiguration”. I argue that metaphors and 
metaphorical thinking are more basic than models and modelling. The former 
can guide reasoning in a holistic, heuristic manner. The latter can be used ana-
lytically to develop the initial metaphorical similarity into articulated analogies. 
Models and metaphors may be deployed explicitly and consciously but may also 
(mis)lead cognition through implicit structuring of thinking. I proceed to give 
examples of the roles which models and metaphors have within different areas 
of (research in) education, teaching, and learning. One example is the explicit 
development of design patterns; another is implicit adherence to either an ac-
quisition metaphor or a participation metaphor of learning. Towards the end, I 
provide tentative answers to three questions posed by my discussion pair, 
Willard McCarty, concerning 1) computer modelling, 2) open-endedness of 
models and metaphors, and 3) situated knowledge and relativism. 
Keywords: Models, metaphors, epistemology, learning, educational research, 
design patterns. 
1.   Introduction 
In this article, I shall present my view of models and metaphors within educa-
tional research, very broadly speaking. I shall start out by articulating the per-
spective and background from which I come and the type of questions I focus 
on. I explicate my understanding of “model” and “metaphor” – and their rela-
tionship – and proceed to give examples of the roles which models and meta-
phors have within different areas of (research in) education, teaching, and 
learning. I thus take on the following questions: 
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- Do you have a preferred definition of models and/or modelling? 
- What is the relation between modelling and reasoning? 
- What is the role of analogy and similarity in modelling? 
- Do you see modelling as a core method in your discipline? 
The perspective and background from which I approach models and metaphors 
is that of educational philosophy, with a particular focus on epistemological 
questions concerning knowledge and learning. I practice educational philoso-
phy as a form of “applied philosophy”, i.e. a discipline, where philosophy is 
put to use within other areas of education research1. I bridge epistemology and 
learning theory, and do so both theoretically and in terms of practical peda-
gogy. It is thus a defining characteristic of my research that I combine philo-
sophical inquiry into the nature and requirements of knowledge and education 
with the conduct and analysis of empirical investigations of learning practices 
inside and outside of schools. On this background, querying the significance of 
models and metaphors as formal and informal reasoning strategies for me con-
cretizes to questions like the following: What role do models, modelling, meta-
phors and metaphorical thinking play in (research on) educational design? 
What role do I as an educational philosopher see them as playing in teaching 
and learning, and in the conceptualization of teaching and learning – in re-
search and practice? What role do I as an epistemologist understand them as 
having in reasoning and cognition in general? 
2. Basic Definition of Models – Preferred Definition 
Ricœur, following Hesse, defines a model as “an instrument of redescription”, 
explaining that “the model is essentially a heuristic instrument that seeks, by 
means of fiction, to break down an inadequate interpretation and to lay the way 
for a new, more adequate interpretation” (Ricœur 2003 [1975], 283). He further 
claims that models have metaphoric reference, in that, by use of the model 
“Things themselves are ‘seen as’; they are identified… with the descriptive 
character of the model.” (Ricœur 2003 [1975], 287). This fundamental relation-
ship between models and metaphors, that models draw on a metaphorical “see-
ing as”, is central to my approach to models. However, I follow Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999, 1980; Johnson 1987) in viewing metaphorical understanding, 
not the linguistic expression of it, as primary. Furthermore, I take models to be 
grounded in metaphorical “seeing as”, rather than the other way around, and in 
contrast to the position – suggested by Ricœur with Black (Ricœur 2003 
                                                             
1  I have explicated my view of ‘applied philosophy’ as a ‘philosophizing with’ in Dohn (2011b). 
A collection of articles articulating and engaging in this type of applied philosophy is found 
in my Professorial Thesis (Habilitation in German) (Dohn 2017). 
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[1975], 283) – that metaphors and models play analogous roles, each within its 
own field (poetics versus science): On my view, metaphorical “seeing as” is a 
holistic coupling of fields where the one is understood “in the light of” the 
other and where the implicitly postulated resemblance between the fields is as 
much a result of the “seeing as” as it is a prerequisite to it. Models expand and 
articulate this holistic coupling into more concrete form, clarifying the resem-
blance, at once aligning and restricting it. This is done by explicating the re-
semblance as an analogy between the fields where traits from the one corre-
spond (most often one-to-one) to traits within the other. Models thus – for good 
and bad – lead thinking along a much more clearly demarcated route than the 
holistic imaginative metaphorical coupling itself. “Modelling” refers to the 
process of explicating the holistic coupling as analogy. Paradigmatic examples 
of models are material or digital configurations/visualizations, mental schema-
tizations, scripts, and theoretical representations. As they are grounded in met-
aphorical “seeing as” understood not as (first and foremost) linguistic expres-
sion, but as understanding of the one field “in the light” or “through the lens” 
of the other, the basis of at least the former three are not necessarily linguisti-
cally articulated. Their explication into analogy will obviously involve linguis-
tic representation and further conceptualization, though. Nonetheless, Ricœur’s 
characterization of models as “redescription” accords too much significance to 
this linguistic articulation process. Likewise, material and digital models typi-
cally provide epistemic affordances through the visualization of relationships 
between aspects, but Ricœur’s terminology easily misleads one to neglect 
visualization and its potentials. Defining models as “instruments for configura-
tion and reconfiguration” appears more appropriate.  
This constitutes my answer to the first question above, i.e. of a preferred 
definition of models and/or modelling. It also indicates my overall take on the 
second and third questions, i.e. which role I as an epistemologist understand 
models, modelling, metaphors and metaphorical thinking to have in reasoning 
and cognition, and what role analogy and similarity play in modelling: Meta-
phors and metaphorical thinking are more basic than models and modelling. 
They can guide reasoning in a holistic, heuristic manner, where the similarity 
postulated by the metaphor is to some extent configured by the metaphor itself. 
Models can be used analytically to gain insights based on developing the initial 
metaphorical similarity into articulated analogies. To this I should add that 
models and metaphors may be deployed explicitly and consciously but may 
also (mis)lead cognition through implicit structuring of thinking.  
In the following, I turn to the more specific questions of the role of models 
and metaphors within education and educational research, including education-
al design. Space limitations bar an exhaustive overview, but I shall provide 
some indicative examples, which between them illustrate both explicit and 
implicit uses. 
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3. Role of Models and Metaphors in (Research on) 
Educational Design 
Educational design may be defined as the organization of learning resources 
and activities to support learners in attaining learning objectives (implicitly or 
explicitly defined). Educational design is carried out by teachers, course plan-
ners, educational developers etc. That is, educational design is not itself re-
search. However, research is undertaken with, for, and on educational design, 
e.g. to develop and test design principles, investigate learning theoretical ques-
tions, or test hypotheses on knowing, motivation, collaborative learning etc. 
Models and metaphors – and modelling and metaphorical thinking – are de-
ployed consciously in educational design, but also play significant roles at a 
more implicit, unreflected and unacknowledged level, as structuring resources 
of thinking. 
One form of explicit, conscious deployment is constituted by the develop-
ment, investigation and subsequent utilization of design patterns to organize 
teaching and learning activities in a structured way (Carvalho and Goodyear 
2014; Goodyear 2005; Mor et al. 2014). The concept of design patterns was 
originally developed by Alexander in the context of architecture to deal with 
recurring problems in a uniform, yet flexible way (Alexander et al. 1977). 
Design patterns provide a core solution (the pattern) which can be used flexibly 
in the diverging multitude of situations where the problem is experienced. 
Within educational design, design patterns constitute models of students’ and 
teachers’ activities (design elements), aimed at a particular goal (e.g. facilita-
tion of reflection or development of problem solving skills), following learn-
ing-theoretically informed principles (design principles) within an overall 
frame such as a lesson, a test, a lab experiment or study time between lessons. 
Examples of design patterns are “the interactive lecture” for learner-centered 
learning (Mor et al. 2014, chap. 1.2.2) and “try once, refine once” for learning 
through assessment (Mor et al. 2014, chap. 4.2.7). Related to this approach, 
again involving explicit, conscious use of models, is the development and 
application of personas in the design of courses or educational programmes: A 
persona is a fictional but realistic character, representative of a group of those 
users one is designing for, in this case potential participants in the course or 
programme. Typically, several personas will be developed based on user stud-
ies. Between them, the personas should cover the range of different user 
groups. The advantage of this use of models is that it is much easier for course 
or programme developers to imagine and take into account learners’ (diverg-
ing) goals, priorities, attitudes and behavior when they have realistic personal-
ized characters to think from. Potential conflicts between learners may also be 
foreseen and counteracted in the design. 
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The development of design patterns and personas is becoming widespread 
within educational design. In this sense, this type of modelling is increasingly 
viewed as a core method within this field (last question above). The scientific 
adequacy of the method is documented, but is still being researched. 
An example of a more implicit use of a model is the understanding – dis-
cernable from educationalists’ practice – of the implementation process in-
volved in realizing design patterns or “best practice” examples in concrete 
educational settings. This implicit model is shown in Figure 1. The gist of it is 
that implementation is a “plug-and-play” process, i.e. that there are no essential 
changes taking place between initial idea, design pattern and actual practice. 
The initial idea is articulated (becoming clearer but “essentially” staying the 
same) and then put to use (presupposing predictability of practice “on all essen-
tial counts”) (Dohn and Hansen 2016).  
Figure 1: Implicit Understanding of Design Pattern Implementation Process 
 
However, this is a very simplistic understanding that is not representative of 
actual implementation processes. There are significant transformational pro-
cesses involved in articulating an idea and convincing others of its viability 
(idea → pattern) and likewise in the actual enactment of the pattern in practice 
(pattern → practice). As argued by Wenger, a design comes into emergent 
being in the concrete realization which people give it within their specific 
communities of practices in attunement to and adaptation of already existing 
routines and participation patterns: “[P]ractice cannot be the result of design, 
but instead constitutes a response to design” (Wenger 1998, 233). The imple-
mentation process is thus more adequately depicted as a “messy”, iterative 
realization process, subject to influence by unforeseen aspects, and therefore 
not strictly predictable and certainly not linear (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Actual Design Pattern Implementation Process 
 
Neglecting the complexities of the implementation process, i.e. implicit adher-
ence to the model in Figure 1, is highly problematic, on the verge of being 
detrimental to learners’ learning: It amounts to ignoring the learners’ differing 
uptakes of and approaches to the design pattern as well as the variance in social 
relationships and interaction patterns across classes/groups of learners. Put 
bluntly, activities which have been successful in one class may fail totally in 
other classes. 
4. Role of Models and Metaphors in (Conceptualizations) 
of Teaching and Learning – In Research and Practice 
Following design patterns or best practice scripts is one way in which models 
are put to use within teaching and learning. Conceptualizations of learning and 
the deployment of these conceptualizations in teaching and learning activities is 
another. One such example is Kolb’s model (Figure 3) of the learning process 
as a cycle where the learner cognitively moves through processes of concrete 
experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active exper-
imentation – leading again to concrete experience and another spin through the 
cycle (Kolb 1984). 
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Figure 3: Kolb's Model of the Learning Process as a Cycle of Cognitive Processes 
 
This model is widely used to argue for the need to engage learners in practical 
activities beyond reading and writing to allow the experiential and experi-
mental processes to take place. It is also used to structure teaching and learning 
activities to ensure that learners move through the circle rather than being stuck 
in one process. A further development of the model is Kolb’s claim that learn-
ers will have a preference for one (or two) of these learning processes. This 
leads to a second model with a set of different learning styles consisting of 
specific combinations of these preferences. Gardner’s model of intelligence as 
comprised of seven different types of intelligence is another example (Gardner 
2006), as is the version of learning styles advocated by Dunn and Dunn (1993, 
1992). All of these models are put to use within educational practice in the 
development of teaching and learning activities corresponding to learners’ 
different styles or intelligences–or alternatively, in activities designed to chal-
lenge them beyond their preferred style or intelligence. Ideally, this approach 
has the advantage of customizing learning to each learner, which presumably 
will heighten their learning outcome. However, there is a clear risk of stigma-
tizing learners. Likewise, not all disciplines may be learnable through all learn-
ing styles/intelligences, just as the competencies required in future jobs may 
not necessarily match all learning styles or intelligences equally well.  
Another example of a model developed in educational research and put to 
use in educational practice is Hiim and Hippe’s relational model intended for 
pedagogical analysis of learning situations (1993). The model stresses the 
interrelationship between six elements: student learning outset, framing factors, 
learning objectives, curricular content, learning process, and evaluation. This 
model is widely used, at least in the Scandinavian countries, both for analysis 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  │  53 
of learning situations and for planning them (though the latter is explicitly 
advised against by Hiim and Hippe). 
At a more implicit level, Sfard has shown that two metaphors of learning 
guide research on learning, namely the metaphor of acquisition and that of 
participation (Sfard 1998). I have argued that the same metaphors are also 
embodied in educational and Web 2.0 practices, respectively, and that prob-
lems arise when the latter are introduced as learning activities within the former 
(Dohn 2009b, 2009a). 
As a last example I wish to point to an ongoing research project that I am 
leading, which is sponsored by the Danish Council for Independent Research, 
Humanities, Grant No. DFF-4180-00062. The title of the project is Designing 
for situated knowledge in a world of change. The overall project aim is to ad-
dress the challenge posed by two seemingly opposed factors: On the one hand, 
the need in today’s society for people to move frequently between settings and 
to put their knowledge learnt in one context to use in others. On the other hand, 
research findings which show knowledge to be situated, i.e. as acquiring form 
and content from the context in which it is learnt (Schön 1983; Lave 1988; 
Lave and Wenger 1991; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Dohn 2011a). These re-
search findings imply that knowledge is not easily transferred from one context 
to another, but needs transformation and resituation. The project has both a 
philosophical side, aimed at investigating what is involved in the transfor-
mation and resituation of knowledge, and a pedagogical side, aimed at develop-
ing concrete designs for learning which facilitate learners in learning to trans-
form and resituate knowledge. Our preliminary findings indicate that it is 
precisely through metaphorical thinking – and to some extent modelling – that 
learners succeed in putting knowledge to use in new contexts. Metaphorical 
thinking is involved in the holistic seeing of new situations “as” known ones 
whilst flexibly attuning to differences between them. Modelling takes place in 
the form of structure mapping of traits based on the basic metaphorical postula-
tion of resemblance between the situations. 
5.  Discussion 
Articulating a view such as mine within the context of this HSR Supplement’s 
focus on the role of models and modelling in the Digital Humanities of course 
raises a number of questions. Willard McCarty has posed particularly succinct 
ones to me. The questions are not easy and I fear that I shall not be able to 
provide satisfactory answers to them – certainly not within the space allotted to 
me; perhaps not at all. A few considerations will have to suffice:  
Firstly, given the context of Digital Humanities, Willard McCarty very rea-
sonably asks what is special about computer modelling (as opposed to any 
other kind). Now, posing the question in this way of course presupposes that 
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something is special about computer modelling – a presupposition which might 
well be challenged. I certainly acknowledge – indeed I would advocate – that 
computer modelling (simulations, visualizations, 3D worlds etc.) permits us to 
have experiences which would be hard or impossible to come by in the physi-
cal world alone, for a number of reasons, including historical, geographical, 
economical, organizational, physical, and skills-related ones. One example is 
provided by McCarty in his contribution to this volume where he references 
John Wall’s Virtual Paul’s Cross (Wall 2016), a computer simulation, made by 
the Virtual St. Paul’s Cathedral Project, which allows one to witness John 
Donne’s sermon for Gunpowder Day, Nov. 5th 1622. Another example is ava-
tar embodiment, which allows one physically impossible bodily experiences 
such as flying or morphing into animal shapes, potentially stimulating reflec-
tions on embodiment itself and its role in cognition and learning (Riis 2016). 
Yet a third is students’ use of simulation programs as part of their academic or 
professional training, e.g. programs emulating chemical reactions or organiza-
tional developments. Computers may thus stimulate imagination, facilitate 
reasoning, and provide us with learning situations in novel ways, potentially 
leading us to insights which we would otherwise be barred from. Nonetheless, I 
am not convinced that computer modelling is special in principle, neither epis-
temologically nor ontologically speaking. Like all other models, computer 
models require a modeler. This modeler may in some instances be a step re-
moved compared to modelers of physical models, in the sense that s/he works 
to provide a model which may itself develop over time. Still, computer models 
depend fundamentally on the imagining of the modeler and on his/her under-
standing of the domain to be modeled – exactly as do physical models. The 
basic ontological status of the computer model is thus no different from that of 
the physical model. Neither is its basic epistemological status: Though it may 
be harder to foresee the specific epistemic affordances for people engaging 
with the computer model than for physical models, the dependency of their 
insights on the scope and direction of the modeler’s understanding is funda-
mentally the same as for physical models. 
A second question McCarty raised concerns the degree to which reasoning 
with metaphors and models can be open-ended. Models, he claims, have an 
analytical focus, are directed to some end, articulated, and spelled out. Fur-
thermore, he claims, both models and metaphors are analogical, and reasoning 
by way of metaphors and models thus is reasoning analogically, from a relation 
between two things we know to a presumed relation between corresponding 
things (A is to B as C is to D). Therefore, it seems, reasoning by way of models 
and metaphors cannot really be open-ended.  
My answer to this question centers on my disagreement with McCarty about 
the claim that metaphorical thinking is analogical. I follow Lakoff and Johnson 
in seeing the dependency between analogy and metaphor as going the other 
way: Metaphorical thinking is primary: it is a holistic seeing-a-whole-field-as-
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another-field through the metaphor as “focal point”. In this way, metaphorical 
thinking is in fact open-ended, in that the focal point does not determine the 
insights to be gleaned by the holistic seeing-as, but sets the outset and domain 
for them. Analogy builds on the metaphorical, holistic seeing-as, but hones in 
on certain aspects of the seeing-the-field-as - explicating that “A is to B as C is 
to D”. Thereby it transforms the initial “seeing as” into something more specif-
ic, at once enabling and restricting cognition. I agree that modelling is analogi-
cal, making it less open-ended than metaphorical reasoning. However, as indi-
cated in my answer to the first question, I do believe that some computer 
modelling, e.g. in the form of 3D simulations, may set the environment for 
experiences which were not to be foreseen. In this way imagination and in-
sights to be inspired from computer modelling may well be quite open-ended. 
A final set of questions from McCarty concerns the ontological implications 
of my situated view of knowledge. He refers to Donna Haraway (1988), who 
has argued interestingly about the nature of knowledge as situated, calling at 
once for a localized embodied epistemology and rejecting both objectivism and 
relativism. In her words, the essential problem for epistemology and for science  
is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for 
all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing 
our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and a no-nonsense 
commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world (579, italics in original).  
McCarty points out that the revolutionary force of the said “radical historical 
contingency” have led theorists such as Ingold to shift from “knowledge that” 
to “knowledge how” and to reconceive the world in terms of skills. But this 
raises the ontological problem of how to come up with Haraway’s “faithful 
accounts of a ‘real’ world”. 
In answering these questions, I should first say that I am sympathetic to 
Donna Haraway’s general epistemological points regarding situated 
knowledge, which is perhaps not surprising, given that we share inspirational 
sources in phenomenological philosophy. I definitely agree, on the one hand, 
that we have to accept the historical contingency of our beliefs, dependent as 
they are on the way we engage with the world to form them. And on the other 
hand, this should not lead us into relativism. I consider myself a pragmatist 
realist, not in the Peircean sense where reality is that on which science con-
verges in claiming the existence of2, but in a phenomenological sense: With 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty I would say that we are always already in the 
world which is as it is on the background of our agency in it. The split between 
subject and object, between cognition and world, is a secondary one, building 
fundamentally on “taking a step back” from the world we are always already 
engaged in and interacting with. Speaking ontologically—and with the under-
                                                             
2  Peirce (1958). 
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standing I get from the anthropologist literature that McCarty refers to in his 
contribution to this volume – it doesn’t make sense (as Popper did and others 
have done after him)3 to talk of a first world of nature and a second world of 
culture. The natural world we live in is a cultural one, formed by our cultural 
interactions with it, and vice versa. Therefore, I find it problematic to speak (as 
objectivist realists would) of the ontological existence of one world that we 
epistemologically speaking have different views upon: Our “views” of the 
world are not static observational views, but are interactional views; i.e. we 
form and are formed by the world in dynamic interaction and our “views” are 
part of this forming and being formed.  
Potentially, we can say, as McCarty does, and as I think Haraway would, 
too, that different cultures have different “realities”, because different cultures 
engage in (and in reaction, correspondingly are formed by) different interac-
tions. They do so, however, around what Charles Taylor called “human con-
stants” (Taylor 1985) as well as in interaction with natural laws etc. Hence it is 
not the case that “anything goes”, and, though there may be more equally good 
answers to what the world is like, not any and every answer is equally good 
(i.e. no relativism on my part). For each culture, there are facts of the matter 
regarding the way the world is structured – and structurable – for them. Provid-
ing an explication of these facts of the matter is, I think, providing the “faithful 
accounts of a ‘real’ world”, based on a world reconceived in terms of skills, 
which McCarty calls for with Haraway and Ingold.  
As a final comment (also upon prompting from McCarty), let me revert 
again to the overall question of this special issue concerning the role of models 
in the Digital Humanities by explicating how computer models figure in my 
pragmatist realism and my understanding of knowledge as situated: As indicat-
ed above, on my view computer models may provide ways to simulate new 
interactions with the world. In this sense, they may indeed provide us with 
“new worlds” – or at least altered ones. Nonetheless, the novelty and strange-
ness of these altered worlds will be delimited in their outset by the framing of 
the modeler’s imaginings. The possibility of computer modelling thus does not 
fundamentally change our ontological and epistemological situation, but it does 
hold the potential for a number of new specific experiences. Hence, it also 
holds the potential for us to develop specific forms of situated knowledge not 
possible in the physical world alone. This situated knowledge will, however, 
still be the knowledge of embodied beings living in a physical world. No matter 
how immersed we are in a digital “virtual world”, we will still be immersed as 
physical beings, who e.g. sit on chairs, interact with keyboard and mouse, get 
sore shoulders from cramping up behind the screen, etc. Our apparent “virtual 
experiences” and “virtual situatedness” will therefore always be those of a real, 
                                                             
3  E.g. Bereiter (Bereiter 1995). Popper argues for his position in (among others) Popper (1972). 
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embodied person. That is, they will in point of fact be real, embodied experi-
ences, not of virtuality per se, but of interacting in hybrid physical-virtual con-
texts. And the situated knowledge developed through this interaction will re-
flect this. 
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Modelling What There Is: Ontologising  
in a Multidimensional World 
Willard McCarty ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellieren was ist: Ontologisierung in einer multidimensionalen 
Welt«. The incursion of digital computing machinery into the public sphere and 
the return of “ontology” from philosophical exile occurred almost simultane-
ously, circa 1948. In this essay I ask, what do the modelling machine and phi-
losophers’ irreconcilable accounts of “what there is” have to do with each oth-
er? Are the ontological pluralism of the former and the multi-centric multi-
naturalism of the latter kin? If so, then recent anthropology has much to say to 
digital humanities. 
Keywords: Modelling, ontology, anthropology, multidimensionality, semantic 
stretch. 
[T]he universe has always appeared to the natural mind as a kind of enigma of which 
the key must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing word or 
name. That word names the universe’s principle, and to possess it is after a fashion 
to possess the universe itself. “God”, “Matter”, “Reason”, “the Absolute”, “Energy”, 
are so many solving names. You can rest when you have them…. But if you follow 
the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such word as closing your quest…. 
[Each word] appears less as a solution… than as a program for more work …. (Wil-
liam James, Pragmatism 1907) 
The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same 
world with different labels attached. (Edward Sapir, The status of linguistics as a 
science 1929)  
The only way you can catch yourself in the act of reflecting on yourself is by becom-
ing another self – a self which, when it looks down on your reflecting self, will not 
be included in the reflection. If you want to understand yourself better, you always 
have to keep on the move. (Jonathan Rée, I See a Voice 1999) 
1.  A Mid Twentieth Century Co-Occurence 
These days, for perfectly obvious reasons, some of us find ourselves telling a 
Spenglerian Untergang des Abendlandes. The evening news confirms that we 
are all going to hell in a handbasket. But when I look around what I see is an 
abundance of compelling scholarship in many disciplines, scholarship that 
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beckons us to interconnect our own work with it and to connect both to the 
world we live in. The connections to be made are reciprocal and recursive: we 
give that others may give back, do ut des, again and again in a cycle that 
changes both. 
Here my aim is more modest than such a large project would suggest but 
still indicative of the benefits. My aim is to suggest – I can do no more than 
that – some of what might result from growing connections with anthropology 
and related disciplines. Anthropologists, you may know, have been interested 
in doing the reverse since at least 1962 (Hymes 1965) and were thinking along 
similar lines from the early 1940s (Heims 1991, chap. 2). Today both sides 
have much more to offer each other than was the case then. 
My story begins with a curious mid-twentieth century co-occurrence in the 
Anglo-American world: of the digital computer (which must be told what there 
is) and of the return from philosophical exile of ontology (the study of what 
there is – or, as Ian Hacking says (2002, 2), of “whatever we individuate and 
allow ourselves to talk about”).1 Stumbling on this co-occurrence led me to 
wonder how the two co-occurrents might be connected beyond computer scien-
tists’ adoption of the term in the late 1970s.2 You may know that thirty years 
earlier, just as the public was becoming aware of computers, philosopher 
Willard Van Orman Quine began giving serious attention not just to ontology 
but to ontologies in the plural.3 (In Germany the co-occurrence happened earli-
er, with Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit in 1927 and Konrad Zuse’s Z-series 
machines from ca. 1935, a year before Turing’s foundational paper.4) I asked 
myself, what might there be in these co-occurrences to help us explain them? 
But then I noticed something else: the rather dramatic and fruitful career, seed-
ed by Quine, that ontology has taken in theoretical anthropology and related 
disciplines for the last few decades. So my question became also this: what 
                                                             
1  A convenient date for the first public exhibition of a large-scale digital computer is the 
launch of the Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator (SSEC) at IBM World Headquarters 
(New York) in 1948, visible from street-level until 1952 (McCarty 2011, viii). For ontology 
see note 3. 
2  For early examples see Kosslyn 1978 (drawing inter alia on Goodman 1968) and McCarthy 
1980, Alexander et al 1986. Formal definition came with Gruber 1995. See also Gruber 
2009, Sowa 2000 (51-131) and Zúñiga 2001. For related activities in Natural Language Pro-
cessing see e.g. Margaret Masterman’s work in the 1950s and 1960s (Priss and Old 2009; 
Sowa 2010 [245-50]); for database design see Sølvberg 1979; Ramsay 2004 (195). 
3  See Quine 1948, (1953) 1961 (his note on “Identity, ostension, and hypothesis”, p. 169, in 
particular), (1960) 2013 and 1969. For the status of ontology at the time see Feibleman 
1949. 
4  At the very beginning of Sein und Zeit ([1927] 2001, §3) Heidegger makes a distinction 
between ontological (Being as such) and ontic (regional or specific Being, i.e. delimited and 
implicitly temporal, as studied in the sciences); see Steiner 1978 (79-80). For Zuse’s devel-
opment of his stored-program computer see Zuse (1993) 2007 (chap. 3). Heidegger’s work 
became known in Anglophone computer science with Dreyfus 1972 and important in that 
discipline thanks to Winograd and Flores 1987. 
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might we learn about the creative potential of digital machines from the schol-
ars of human historical and contemporary alterity? 
Nothing in the literature suggests that computer scientists took much notice 
of philosophy when they started talking about ontology. Perhaps they thought 
they didn’t need to, since ontology is obviously fundamental to computing 
machinery: after all, to do any useful work the machine must be given a model 
of what there is (Smith 1985). But the complexity of the world and limitations 
of time constrain any implementable ontology to be a version of the domain to 
which it applies, that is, to be an ontology, one of many. Hence the implicit, 
more specific and possibly important connection between the digital machine 
and both Quine’s and Heidegger’s pluralisation. 
2. The Popularity of “Model”, Many Ontologies and 
Cosmological Change 
To get further with this, let me take a different tack. When we think about 
models carefully, as Nelson Goodman did in Languages of Art (1968), we can 
become quite annoyed, as he did, at the ungovernable, viral appeal of the word 
“model”. For us its sloppy use makes its specifically computational sense diffi-
cult to pick out; in consequence, we are apt to miss what is genuinely new and 
so have no convincing answer other than “more, faster” to rightfully skeptical 
colleagues. But its popularity is an inescapable fact, I realised. So I started to 
ask, why is it so popular? Was the invention of the digital machine a like re-
sponse, as the coordinated surge of word and thing would suggest? [Figure 1]. 
Might the same be true for “ontology”? What can we learn from that? What are 
they responses to? Answers aren’t as obvious as may seem: Plato’s Symposium 
teaches that we tend to go for what is achingly present in its absence, and so 
want, and thus desire. Rather than go for a quick dismissal by reference to 
technological determinism, pure coincidence or the fog of a Zeitgeist, I won-
dered if we might be able to identify a Foucauldian “historical a priori”5 – or, 
to paraphrase Jonathan Rée, that metaphysical notion which, in the middle of 
the last century, infiltrated ordinary common sense and became a real force in 
the world (1999, 382). 
Consider, for example, Quine’s argument that translation is inevitably inde-
terminate 2013 [1960] chap. 2), from which he concludes that we can do no 
better than many incompatible stock-takings of the world’s goods. Put that next 
to Quine’s friend and reader Thomas Kuhn’s argument two years later in The 
                                                             
5  The phrase is from Georges Canguilhem’s review of his former student Michel Foucault’s Les 
mots et le choses (1966) in Canguilhem 2005/1967, 90; quoted and discussed in Hacking 
2002, 5. 
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Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2012 [1962]) for the inevitability of succes-
sive, incompatible, indeed incommensurable paradigms. Consider also my 
favourite example of a clarion-call within digital humanities: the American 
literary critic Louis Milic’s short article, published four years after Structure, in 
which he wrote that, “We are still not thinking of the computer as anything but 
a myriad of clerks or assistants in one convenient console” (and I would go so 
far as to say “a myriad of servants”, since for us their far quicker, less intrusive 
and better service is so discrete as to be all but invisible). “The true nature of 
the machine is unknown to us…”, he went on to say (and I would add, un-
known because this “nature” is not natural, not a given, but an emergent recur-
sive co-creation of human and machine). Milic saw, as he said, that “Its intelli-
gence and ours must be made complementary….”, and so implied the crucial 
beyond-the-Turing-Test question of what we take intelligence to be. He went 
on: “Thinking in a new way is not an easy accomplishment. It means”, he said, 
“reorientation of all the coordinates of our existence” (1966, 4-5, my empha-
sis). It means, in other words, a cosmological reconfiguration. He called his 
brief article, “The next step”. It was, I like to point out, the first article in the 
first issue of the first journal in digital humanities. I don’t think we’ve taken 
that step yet. 
3. The “Ontological Turn” in Anthropology 
I intended no causal implications when I said that Quine seeded later develop-
ments in anthropology, though his thought-seed did germinate there. What he 
actually did, on record, was to draw an analogy between the ontologising phi-
losopher and a fictional anthropological linguist attempting to translate an 
imagined native’s exclamation at the sight of a rabbit (2013 [1960], 25ff.). 
Such was and is the field anthropologist’s dilemma, the core scenario to which 
some anthropologists have responded by making what has been called “the 
ontological turn”, away from the epistemological angst Quine depicted to 
something rather new.6 Commenting on Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think: 
Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human (2013), for example, Philippe 
Descola refers to 
[the] general predicament that some of us… find ourselves enmeshed in. To 
put it simply, the project of repopulating the social sciences with nonhuman 
beings, and thus of shifting the focus… toward the interactions of humans 
with (and between) animals, plants, physical processes, artifacts, images, and 
other forms of beings… (2014) 
                                                             
6  Increasingly noisy since Henare, Holbraad and Wastell identified “a quiet revolution” and 
applied the term “ontological turn” to it (2007, 1, 7). 
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Modelling (we might say) everywhere, of everything, by every being with 
agency.  
The arguments quickly become complex, intricate, difficult. I can only pre-
sent a sliver. Almira Salmond’s helpful overview in the journal Hau sorts the 
enthusiastic confusion this turn has become into “three ethnographic strategies 
for addressing ontological alterity” (2014): Tim Ingold’s, Descola’s and the 
one she favours, which for want of space is my sole focus here. She calls it 
“recursive” because it draws recursively, transformatively on “the imaginative 
powers of the… peoples and collectives” whom anthropology proposes to 
explain.7 Its leading proponent, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, defines it in stark 
contrast to what he calls “our modern cosmological vulgate”: the multicultural-
ist supposition of “a single world or nature… around which different partial 
cultural views orbit” (2010, 329). This vulgate sounds pleasingly liberal and 
democratic. Look closely, he argues, and the single world it supposes turns out 
to be our world universalised. In other words, take a step back and this world 
begins to look very much like Michel Foucault’s invocation of Jeremy Ben-
tham’s panopticon.8 In the late eighteenth century Bentham designed a cylin-
drical prison with a central watch-tower from which all inmates could be se-
cretly observed. Because no inmate could know when he was being watched, 
the panopticon induced “the sentiment of an invisible omniscience”9 – a crip-
pling, economical god’s-eye view. Hence the predicament of those entrapped 
by their very visibility, as Foucault has said, and thus Viveiros de Castro’s 
metaphor for the colonising grip of that panoptic cosmological vulgate.  
4. The Multidimensionality of the Real and Our “Next 
Step” 
Ontology had to change before the turn in anthropology could be made, from 
elaboration of a “great chain of being” to a probing which reveals multiple 
ontologies.10 The modelling machine, working through many disciplines, has 
undoubtedly been an influential part of this change, so also the viral spread of 
the term “model”. Remarkably, throughout the panic of relativism in the “sci-
ence wars”,11 modelling and the many ontologies it makes operational have 
diversified not destroyed the idea of the real. The anthropologists I have quoted 
                                                             
7  Viveiros de Castro 2014 [2009], 40. 
8  Foucault, “Panopticism”, in Foucault 1995 [1975], 195-228; plate 3 shows Bentham’s de-
sign). See Bentham1995. 
9  A widely quoted phrase, not in Bentham’s works, often attributed to an anonymous archi-
tect. See Nugent 2011; Lyon 2006. 
10  Lovejoy 2001 [1936]; see also Lovejoy 1909. 
11  Hacking 1999; Geertz 1984. 
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have responded by taking “the enemy’s point of view” seriously – Viveiros de 
Castro’s phrase 1992 [1986] – as a recursive instrument of disciplinary self-
redefinition. Such recursion is no stranger to modelling. Ancient historian and 
anthropological fellow-traveller G. E. R. Lloyd has used his half-century of 
meticulous comparative analyses of ancient Greek and Chinese thought to draw 
out the “multidimensionality” of the real and to show the “semantic stretch” it 
requires of us.12 We might call this the agile modelling of an endlessly faceted 
world. Thirty-five years ago Ian Hacking, in Representing and Intervening 
(1983), argued cogently that new things become real by means of manipulatory 
experimental modelling. In his essay “Historical Ontology”, he has asked, 
echoing Foucault: “if we are concerned with the coming into being of the very 
possibility of some objects, what is that if not historical?” What does such 
reasoning lead to if not specific, local ontologies, “molded in time”?13 
What is to be done with these anthropological, historical and philosophical 
inflections of modelling gone viral – with the possibilities they suggest and the 
demanding help they offer for growing nascent digital humanities into one of 
the literae humaniores? That’s the question I struggle with. Half a century on 
from Louis Milic’s “The Next Step” I wonder what we can say his cosmologi-
cal reconfiguration would entail if we took it seriously by taking on the anthro-
pologists’ challenge. To use Clifford Geertz’s terms, it would mean something 
far beyond the mimetic “modelling of” real-world data, beyond also “modelling 
for” objects that begin as more or less definite ideas and aim at concrete reali-
sation.14 Both of these will, of course, remain valuable things to do. But they 
are hardly sufficient for a computing of as well as in the interpretative disci-
plines. (Let us be done with the crippling fright of the technoscience which 
makes our beloved machine possible and with the equally damaging ignorance 
of social thought, and so call these disciplines the human sciences.) 
What I think taking Milic’s next step might lead to most immediately is a 
concerted, experimental, hardware-actualised enquiry into what we mean by 
“intelligence”, by “reason”, by “cognition” – recursively involving the ma-
chine’s point of view with our own as both develop in interaction with each 
other. This is not the already well developed programme to demonstrate that 
cognition is computational, rather to find out through a back-and-forth conver-
sation what it is.15 It would mean enquiring into the machine’s cosmology, as it 
is now, as it could become. This enquiry would mean, to paraphrase Viveiros 
                                                             
12  Lloyd 2015, 5. See Inwood and McCarty 2010, contributions to which embrace all three of 
Salmond’s ethnographic approaches to ontology. For a summary of Lloyd’s work, <https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloyd> (Accessed December 19, 2016). 
13  Hacking 2002, 2, 4; Foucault 1984. See also Lovejoy 1909. 
14  For a discussion see McCarty 2013 [2005], 24; referring to Geertz 1993 [1973], 93. 
15  Yes, some of this goes on in the cognitive sciences, but we in the humanities have not 
included ourselves, nor have these sciences looked often to the humanities for more than 
window-dressing. 
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de Castro, treating ideas indigenous to digital hardware as concepts to think 
with, then following the consequences, defining the range of possibilities these 
concepts presuppose, the conceptual persona they make possible, the reality 
they delimit (2014, 187). This is in no way to disrespect the Amazonians and 
the others from whom Viveiros de Castro and colleagues have learned so 
much. It is, rather, to ask if we can learn from these anthropologists in turn 
what it means to pull oneself away from the narcissistic self-entrapment that 
Joseph Weizenbaum discovered in the mid-1960s when users of his conversa-
tional program Eliza mistook it for their confessor.16 It is to ask whether the 
ontological turn in the anthropological sense has taken hold in digital humani-
ties. 
Is it not nascent in what the scholar-programmer already does, most when 
designing, building and refining simulations? Elsewhere I have argued that the 
great lesson to be learned from simulation – which is modelling turned loose to 
go where it can – is that it shows computing to be just such a producer of fic-
tion: an instrument not so much for nailing down facts (although it can do that) 
but for imagining them, acting them out, solidifying them, in some cases giving 
us a new (tentative) reality to probe (McCarty 2018). I know of no better ex-
ample of this than John Wall’s simulation of John Donne’s Gunpowder Day 
sermon in 1622 as it might have been delivered from the long-vanished Paul’s 
Cross preaching station adjacent to the medieval St Paul’s, which the Great 
Fire of London destroyed in 1666. With his Virtual Paul’s Cross Wall explores 
“what we are doing when we believe we have discovered, from our experience 
with a digital environment, things about past events that are not documented by 
traditional sources” (2016,283). That’s a cliff-edge, inviting flight, a fiction (to 
paraphrase Viveiros de Castro) that is historiographical, but historiography that 
is not fictional: a digital machine’s perspective on the sermon preached on a 
semi-fictional occasion by a semi-fictional John Donne from a semi-fictional 
Paul’s Cross in a semi-fictional space to a semi-fictional crowd. Ironically we 
have very good reason to think that it is a better, more truthful fiction than we 
get by pretending that Donne’s published words, which he wrote down some-
time later from the notes he used while preaching, are the real sermon. 
In 1962 Cambridge linguist Margaret Masterman proposed that the comput-
er could become a “telescope of the mind”, changing, as the early telescope 
did, our whole conception of the world (1962, 38-9). Some toss this off. But is 
the instrument as unproblematic as her metaphor seems to imply? To echo 
Hacking (1983, 186-209), do we see through, or see through, a telescope? 
Today (just as in microscopy) optoelectronics interpose a hermeneutic black-
box between the eye and its object, complicating – but not essentially altering – 
                                                             
16  See esp. the introduction to Weizenbaum 1976. Note that according to its author, Cannibal 
Metaphysics is a commentary on an unwritten, fictional book entitled Anti-Narcissus: An-
thropology as a Minor Science (Viveiros de Castro 2014 [2009], 39). 
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the philosopher’s question. For when Galileo looked through his occhialino 
much of what he saw had been seen before, but the differences were enough to 
make “what was” “momentarily mutable”, stuff of the eye reshaped by his 
mind into “a compelling argument for Copernicanism”.17 
Disciplines, I like to say, are not places of arrival, clubs to be joined, identi-
ties to assume or platforms of visibility, but starting-points. So the question is: 
where from here? There are many maps. 
5.  Figure 
Figure 1 
 
  
                                                             
17  Thanks to Crystal Hall (Bowdoin) for the commentary on Galileo, in private e-mail, 6/1/17. 
The literature is extensive; see esp. Lipking 2014; Biagioli 2006, chap. 2. 
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6.  Discussion 
NBD: Nina Bonderup Dorn 
RB: Rens Bod 
GO: Gunnar Olsson 
FJ: Fotis Jannidis 
WM: Willard McCarty 
 
In her dedicated response NBD singled out the alterity of worlds, especially its 
connection with the concept of situated knowledge in her own paper. She ques-
tioned the implications of “ontological turn”, asking whether the change is not 
so much a rejection of epistemological concerns but a product of them and a 
shift of emphasis. WM agreed, noting the meandering of “turns”, now this way, 
now that, common in academic disciplines, each turn attempting to correct for 
prior deficiencies. NBD wanted to know what is “the machine’s point of 
view”? WM responded by referring to the mediation enforced by the absolute 
consistency and complete explicitness of the digital medium and to the combi-
natorial negotiation implicit in modelling. He argued again for the crucial im-
portance of binary logic on the one hand and imaginative play against that foil 
on the other. 
RB noted that the fictionalizing trajectory of computational simulation, as in 
the example of the Virtual Paul’s Cross, is not yet accepted in the humanities. 
WM pointed to the mistaken belief that the computer is a fact-and-proof ma-
chine, a “knowledge-jukebox”, and advocated strong emphasis on the machine 
as an instrument of the imagination. RB mentioned the corrosive effects of 
simulation on mind/body dualism. 
GO, following up on NBD’s point about the “ontological turn”, offered the 
arresting counter-metaphor of epistemological and ontological concerns as 
diachronic intertwined strands, each dependent on the other. 
FJ, finally, asked what possibly we can mean by using such words as “intel-
ligence” and “perspective” when talking about machines. He asked if such talk 
is guilty of a category error. WM thought that the development and adoption of 
digital machinery was eroding such categorical distinctions, that drawing such 
lines has a long history of being redrawn to save outmoded ideas of the human. 
He may have quoted Evelyn Fox Keller, to the effect that asking if a product of 
computational biology is alive is beginning to look like an historical rather than 
a philosophical question. And he may have added that “intelligence” no longer 
looks like a single benchmark. 
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